A substantial body of theoretical, qualitative, and experimental research has investigated whether reliance on legal threats "crowds out" informal, norm-based ways of regulating behavior or, instead, whether the ability to enforce law formally enhances the ability of private parties to use these informal approaches. There has, however, been little quantitative, real-world work that looks into this question. This article begins this process through a study of how franchisors regulate the incentives that their franchisees have to cut corners on the brand's quality and uniformity standards. One solution to this problem is to threaten to pursue a breach of contract action for violation of these standards, which allows the franchisor to obtain a damage award against a franchisee. Alternatively, a franchisor can rely on more informal means, such as awarding an extra franchise outlet to those franchisees who behave well. There is a tradeoff between these two mechanisms; the informal rewards are costly to provide, but easy to enforce, while contractual threats are cheap, but their enforcement is expensive. Moreover, the literature on relational governance suggests that the use of formal legal threats may undermine an agent's willingness to abide by reciprocation norms along noncontractible dimensions. These theories suggest that formal and informal mechanisms will act as substitutes and this study, which uses a newly collected data set of franchise agreements, provides strong evidence for that assertion. The analytical insight that permits this inference is the presence of liquidated damages provisions as an indicator of the willingness to use formal law. Courts have shown hostility to the use of the default rule of expectation damages, but they will enforce liquidated damages terms, which means that these provisions are a credible threat to use formal legal sanctions. This study finds that a limited number of franchisors use these terms and that their presence correlates negatively and significantly with variables that are associated with informal, nonlegal means of incentivizing franchisees.
The interaction between the use of formal law and more informal means to regulate behavior has been the subject of extensive inquiry.
1 A central question, if not the central question, in this line of research is whether the ability to enforce promises or obligations legally complements or substitutes for the ability to use informal rewards and sanctions to accomplish the same ends. This focus is appropriate because the decision to extend legally enforceable protections to a new area can turn on whether the introduction of law will bolster or undermine the nonlegal mechanisms of influence and control that are already in place. The existing theoretical and experimental research in this area has yet to fully isolate the factors that contribute to these outcomes. This lack of clarity is a product of competing explanations and conflicting evidence.
Advocates of the complementarity view, such as Douglass North, stress that "[f]ormal rules can complement and increase the effectiveness of informal constraints." 2 Underlying this argument is the supposition that the incentives provided by formal contracts reduce the gains that a party can receive from short-term defection and, in so doing, this mechanism increases the value of adhering to informal promises. The substitutability view, alternatively, emphasizes that threats to impose formal punishments can undermine the reciprocity norm that underpins informal approaches to governance. Those who advocate this view contend that the use of formal incentives or punishments signals that a relationship is solely economic and, thus, the parties do not expect other parties to reciprocate pro-social behavior. Or, as some put it, formal law "crowds out" informal virtue. 3 The experimental evidence for both views is mixed. Some studies have found strong evidence for the "crowd-out" thesis by contrasting the outcomes of nonrepeated principal-agent games where some subjects can use incentive contracts and others cannot. These studies show that the ability to use enforceable agreements results in less cooperation when there are moderate levels of contract enforcement. 4 Other experiments adjust the contracting conditions and find that the amount of substitution has a stronger effect in the late stages of finitely repeated games and as players gain more 1 See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 Geo. L.J. 1457 (2005) (arguing that law's assurance of contract performance encourages trustworthy behavior); Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1643 Rev. (1996 ; David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 373 (1990) . franchise agreements and, in their stronger forms, threaten contractually specified damages against franchisees for failure to comply with franchise standards. The informal approaches to governance, in contrast, rely on the allocation of rewards and punishments that do not require any resort to written contract terms. A franchisor could, for example, condition the award of an additional outlet to a franchisee on the basis of whether the franchisee has invested an appropriate amount of effort into the initial outlet. Likewise, a franchisor can threaten to open a nearby outlet if the franchisee has been misbehaving. 14 Of course, neither of these options will be ideal. Enforcing contracts requires the expense and uncertainty associated with litigation, while using relational governance depends on the ready availability of informal rewards and punishments that can be costly to use.
Several features of franchising allow for an empirical inquiry into the connection between these two governance mechanisms. Thirteen states obligate franchisors to make public the disclosure documents they provide to prospective franchisees by filing these documents with the appropriate state agency. 15 These documents provide an array of data about individual franchises and also include the contracts that the franchisors currently offer to potential franchisees. These contracts are uniform across the franchise system, which means that the contract terms should reflect the franchisor's judgment about the wisdom of using formal enforcement given the aggregate characteristics of the franchise and potential franchisees. 16 Court treatment of these contracts allows for even more precision in identifying the favored approaches of franchisors because, while courts have been hostile to the default rule of expectation damages in the context of franchising, they have been receptive to claims for liquidated damages. 17 This feature of the case law permits the inference that a liquidated damages clause in the uniform contract is a credible commitment to pursue the stipulated payment for breach by the franchisee. Using franchise data about the availability of relational governance mechanisms, combined with the presence of liquidated damages, 14 The effectiveness of this option depends on the territorial rights specified in the franchise agreement. 15 The states that require public filing of the disclosure documents are: California, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. See <http:// www.ftc.gov/bcp/franchise/netdiscl.shtm>. 16 Researchers have suggested that this uniformity is a product of legal registration requirements and a desire to avoid the transaction costs that would be necessary to negotiate contracts individually. See Roger D. Blair & Francine Lafontaine, The Economics of Franchising 269 (2005) (reviewing the evidence of uniformity in contracts and citing survey evidence on the beliefs of franchisors as to the reasons for uniformity). 17 Franchise agreements that use the default rule of expectation damages, either by stating the rule expressly or leaving the contract silent on damages, face several obstacles to enforcement. First, it is costly to prove what the profits would have been had the franchisee not breached the agreement. This determination often requires dueling experts whose expense can quickly exceed the likely gain from a damage award. Second, courts have been hostile to lost profits claims on the grounds of certainty and fairness. They do not have these reservations when it comes to liquidated damages provisions. See Section II.B.1 for further discussion. See also Robert L. Ebe, David L. Steinberg & Brett R. Waxdeck, Radisson and the Potential Demise of the Sealy-Barnes-Hinton Rule, 27 Franchise L.J. 3, 11 (2007) (stating, after a review of recent cases, the "admittedly unremarkable proposition" that liquidated damages provisions "increase the likelihood of recovering lost future profits").
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provides evidence of the factors that influence whether franchisors will use this credible threat of damages to police franchisee behavior. The ability to measure both formal threats and informal governance allows this study to assess the relationship between these two mechanisms and provide evidence of whether they substitute for each other or complement each other.
Before turning to the data, this article draws on previous work in franchising and the experimental literature on relational governance to develop a theory of how the formal threat of liquidated damages and more informal mechanisms are likely to interact. The theory speculates that damages and relational governance should act as substitutes because, while both mechanisms can achieve the same goal, the costs of supplying them can vary widely. If one of these mechanisms can effectively deter shirking in a cost effective way, the use of the other mechanism will tend to increase expenses without a related governance benefit. This theory modifies the prevailing model of how franchisors can induce franchisee compliance. This model, developed by Benjamin Klein, argues that franchisors will compel franchisees to invest effort by providing them with a level of compensation that exceeds their next-best opportunities and will threaten to take away this compensation if the franchisee is observed shirking. 18 As long as the net present value of this extra compensation-often called rents-eclipses the potential gain from withholding effort, franchisees should refrain from shirking. Using these rents as a governance mechanism, however, requires franchisors to forego revenues, which is not the case for contract damages. 19 This feature makes contract damages attractive and, in a world without enforcement costs or limited liquidity, this approach should be favored by franchisors.
Franchisors do, however, face a reality of expensive litigation, potentially judgmentproof franchisees, and the possibility that threatening to use formal legal punishments will undermine cooperative behavior by franchisees. Rents can avoid some of these problems because they do not depend on franchisee budget constraints, they do not necessarily require the potential enforcement costs that come with termination of the contract, and they may not "crowd out" cooperative franchisee behavior. The ability to avoid enforcement costs can allow franchisors to police franchisee behavior on the basis of observation alone, which provides a substantial advantage when observation is inexpensive and verification is costly. 20 The relative cost of providing these rents should be an important determinant of whether franchisors use them to police franchisees. Some rents are quite inexpensive-if a franchise is growing rapidly, awarding additional outlets to franchisees that do not shirk 18 See Benjamin Klein, The Economics of Franchise Contracts, 2 J. Corp. Fin. 9 (1995) (developing a model that explains the self-enforcement of contracts through a combination of rent creation and the threat of termination).
19
As others have noted, Klein's approach is an application of the efficiency wage theory to franchising. See Lafontaine & Reynaud, supra note 12. 20 Examining the problems that arise when parties can observe breach of a contract, but cannot verify that breach, has been a central focus of incomplete contract theory. For a recent treatment that addresses the principal-agent problems that arise when both parties face moral hazard and considers the role of contract damages and rents, see Oliver Gürtler & Matthias Kräkel, Double-Sided Moral Hazard, Efficiency Wages, and Litigation, 26 J.L. Econ. & Org. 337 (2010) (examining how litigation costs affect the choices of efficiency wages and bonus payments).
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Badawi functions both as a rent and as a cheap screening mechanism. If a mature franchise has saturated most markets, however, it may be prohibitively expensive to open new outlets, which limits the use of these types of rents to govern franchisee behavior.
The empirical evidence supports the theory that where one type of governance approach is likely to be effective, franchisors tend to forego use of the other mechanism. That franchisors do not all rely on credible damage threats is evident in the simple descriptive statistic that, of the 89 contracts in the sample, only 20 contain a liquidated damages provision. Further analysis suggests that when it is less expensive to use relational mechanisms of governance, franchisors will favor these approaches over the use of credible damage threats. There is, for example, a negative association between the growth in franchise outlets, which is a plausible measure of the cost of using new outlets to reward franchisees, and the use of liquidated damages. Likewise, there is a negative relationship between the amount of time a franchisor has been franchising and liquidated damage provisions. This finding is consistent with the theory because one should expect increased experience to allow franchisors to fine tune their ability to monitor franchisees and to reward or punish them without resort to contract and-as some experimental studies show-longer-term relationships tend to facilitate reliance on informal reciprocity.
The evidence further suggests that liquidated damages tend to be attractive only when relational mechanisms are difficult to implement. These damage terms are most prevalent in motel and real estate brokerage franchises-industries where the fungible nature of the franchisee's assets make it easier to switch to another franchise. 21 This ability to move to another brand undermines the franchisor's influence over franchisee behavior through relational means because the exit option places a limit on the size of potential punishments. When exit is a much more expensive proposition for a franchisee-one cannot easily convert a Burger King into a Taco Bell-relational punishments should be a more effective means of governance.
These findings have implications for both the relational governance literature and the literature on the economics of franchising. The main contribution to the study of relational governance is a quantitative, real-world showing that where parties can govern a relationship through informal means, they will sometimes forego the option of contract damages even when the marginal cost of adding this term is low-in other words, formal and relational governance can act as substitutes rather than complements. The evidence also suggests that, at least in this sample, the preference for using relational means over formal means can be very strong even when there is extensive use of written agreements and the transactions are, at least at the outset, at arm's length. The primary contribution to the study of franchising is an empirical investigation of Klein's self-enforcement model.
22
Although the evidence confirms that some franchisors will use rents to prevent shirking, it also shows that contract damages act as an alternative to this model.
21
In the sample of 89 contracts, all four motel franchises and three of the four real estate brokerages have contracts that contain a liquidated damages provision.
22
See Klein, supra note 18 (developing a model of franchise self-enforcement that does not consider the role of damages).
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The analysis proceeds as follows. Section I describes the sample of 89 franchise documents from 2007 and uses descriptive statistics from the data to discuss the observed structure of franchise contracts. Section II draws on the relational governance and franchising literatures to develop a theory about why liquidated damages are likely to substitute for relational means of governing the franchise relationship. Section III finds support for the theory through a series of regressions that assess whether the presence of a liquidated damage provision has a positive or negative relationship with variables such as start-up costs, growth rates, and experience. Section IV discusses some implications for these findings and concludes.
I. The Structure of Franchise Contracts
This section provides an introduction to the general structure of franchise contracts by reviewing the data source and by describing the content of the agreements. The first subsection details the selection of the sample and the collection of the disclosure documents. The second subsection describes the common elements shared across the contracts and provides descriptive statistics on the elements of the agreements that differ.
A. The Target Sample and the Data Source
The franchise contracts collected for this study come from the uniform franchise offering circulars (UFOCs) that franchisors must file with regulatory authorities in the states that require franchise registration. 23 These UFOCs contain 20 plain-language disclosures required by the FTC and a series of mandatory exhibits includes the franchise agreement, supplementary agreements, financial disclosures, and related information. The 20 items in the UFOC explain key terms in the contract and related start-up costs, such as the initial franchise fee, the estimated costs for establishing the business, royalty rates, whether the franchise provides exclusive territories, and the like. For each firm, the UFOC also reports the number of franchised outlets, the number of company-owned outlets, and the number of cancellations and terminations for the previous three years.
The target sample for this study is the top 100 franchises as ranked by Entrepreneur Magazine in 2008, a list that scholars have used to draw samples in franchise research. 24 Of 23 I use the term UFOC because the sample documents were, for the most part, filed with state franchise agencies when these documents still had that title. In 2007, the FTC promulgated a rule that changed the title of this document to a franchise disclosure document. 16 C.F.R. § § 436-437. The rule also changed a number of rules for what must be disclosed to prospective franchisees, such as a more complete description of the corporate structure of the franchisor and the chain of ownership of an outlet. 24 See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation and Arbitration: An Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. Legal Stud. 549 (2003) . The magazine bases these rankings on "objective, quantifiable measures of a franchise operation." The magazine states that " [t] he most important factors include financial strength and stability, growth rate and size of the system." Other considerations include "the number of years a company has been in business and the length of time it's been franchising, startup costs, litigation, percentage of terminations, and
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Badawi the 100 franchises on the list, 98 of the UFOCs filed in 2007 were available from FRANdata, a firm that collects data on franchises. Nine of the observations were dropped because either the business model differed materially from the standard franchise arrangement 25 or data for a key variable were not available.
26 Table 1 lists the names of the franchises in the sample by industry.
For each franchisor, I coded a number of contract variables, business model variables, and external variables. The contract variables include terms such as length of the contract term, renewal rights, royalty rates, damage provisions, and the like. The business model variables include operational features of the franchise that are memorialized in the contract such as the use of exclusive territories and the requirement that the franchisee engage in day-to-day operation of the outlet. The external variables include data that are not contained in the contract such as the number of franchised and company-owned outlets in the system, the growth rate, and the average of the minimum and maximum start-up cost estimates provided by the franchisor.
For the contract variables, I coded the content of the master agreement included in the disclosure document. This master agreement applies in all the states that do not regulate the content of franchise agreements. To accommodate states that do have these regulations, the contracts include state-specific addenda that alter the provisions in the master agreement that do not comply with the relevant statute. With several exceptions noted below, the variables of interest in this project are not the target of franchise regulation laws.
B. Contract Structure and Some Descriptive Statistics
The contracts in the sample share several common elements. All the agreements give the franchisee a limited right to use the intellectual property of the franchisor-principally trademarks and trade secrets-for a stated period of time. The agreements all specify payment obligations of some type, which typically include an up-front franchise fee, an ongoing obligation to pay royalties, and required contributions to advertising and marketing funds. Table 2 , which provides summary statistics for a number of internal and external variables, shows that the average contract term in the sample is 12.3 years. Although contracts typically do not specify the amount of the start-up investment, they do state the obligations that this investment entails, such as rental or purchase of suitable property, a commitment to purchase the approved fixtures needed to operate an outlet, training requirements, and the like.
whether the company provides financing." See <http://www.entrepreneur.com/franchises/franchise500/ about.html>.
25
In some cases, such as Ace Hardware, the business model is a retailer-owned cooperative rather than a franchise. In other cases, the only UFOC available was for master franchisors who recruit franchisees rather than own or operate outlets.
26
For example, the length of the Supercuts contract varies based on the length of the lease that the franchisor can acquire. Supercuts is one of the relatively small number of franchises that obligates franchisees to lease or sublease directly from the franchisor. McDonald's and Seven-Eleven are also in this category. Table 3 breaks down some of these statistics and shows that there is substantial variation in the length of contract terms by industry and reports that the average start-up cost across all industries is about $571,000. This table shows that fast-food, convenience store, and lodging franchise agreements generally require longer terms and higher initial start-up costs relative to realtor, gyms, and cleaning-service franchises. Table 4 provides a cross-tabulation based on the presence of a liquidated damage provision and demonstrates that there are large differences in the start-up costs and two-year growth rates of the firms that do, and do not, have liquidated damages provisions in their contracts.
Of primary importance for this project, the contracts state the obligations of the franchisee and spell out the consequences of failing to adhere to these standards. These Relational Governance and Contract Damages terms vary from the precise, such as provisions stating the day and time when royalty payments are due or terms specifying the suppliers from which the franchisee must purchase, to the vague and open ended, such as clauses that require the franchisee to exert "best efforts" in carrying out the requirements of the contract. While about 18 percent of the agreements give the franchisee the right to terminate the agreement for any reason, only one agreement out of the 89 gives the franchisor the right to terminate without cause. 27 This finding is noteworthy because state franchise termination laws often require a showing of cause in order for the franchisor to terminate-a right that nearly all the franchisors in the sample are providing in the states that do not regulate franchise contracts. Franchisors could specify a right to at-will termination in these states, but they are not doing so.
The contracts that require cause for termination specify a limited number of reasons that allow the franchisor to terminate the agreement immediately-such as the franchisee filing a bankruptcy petition or being convicted of a felony-and those deficiencies that the franchisee has an opportunity to cure. Failure to adhere to the quality and uniformity standards of the franchise is almost always a default that the franchisee has an opportunity to cure, 28 but after multiple violations of this sort, the contract allows the franchisor to 27 The sole contract that allowed termination for cause is Results! Travel, which has a term of only one year and a franchise fee of just $600.
28
The contracts do not lay out these quality or uniformity standards; instead, they use mechanisms such as incorporating the franchise manual by reference and reserving the right for the franchisor to conduct unannounced inspections. 754 Badawi terminate the relationship, which usually triggers a specified set of obligations. These obligations almost always provide for prompt payment of outstanding amounts, return of franchise manuals, and immediate take down of signs and fixtures that associate the outlet with the franchise. The contracts vary substantially in whether they require payment of contract damages when the franchisor properly terminates the agreement for cause. About 65 percent of contracts contain no provision for damages and, presumably, incorporate the default rule of expectation damages. Twelve percent of the contracts expressly state the default rule. 29 The remaining contracts, about 23 percent of them, contain liquidated damages clauses that require a payment to the franchisor if the franchisor properly terminates the contract. 30 The liquidated damages terms usually base damages on the average annual amount of royalty payments in the past two or three years and require the franchisee to pay an amount that multiplies the annual average by a number of years. The number of years ranges from a small number of specified years-perhaps one or two years-to the time remaining under the contract, which, given the long length of some franchise contracts, can be a high number. Of the 20 contracts that contain liquidated damages provisions, nine of them specify that estimated royalty payments are due for the remaining term of the contract. The remaining 11 contracts specify a temporal range of one to four years, with a mean of 2.4 years. The motel and real estate franchises make particularly heavy use of liquidated terms; all four of the motels and three of the four real estate brokerages in the sample have contracts that contain liquidated damage provisions.
The agreements specify the rights and procedures that apply if a franchisee wishes to transfer the outlet and the related process triggered by expiration of the agreement. Almost all the contracts permit the franchisee to transfer the franchise with the permission of the franchisor, although 76 of the agreements give the franchisor a right of first refusal if the franchisee receives a bona-fide offer for the franchise from a third party. A majority of the contracts-52 out of 89-grant the franchisor an option to purchase the assets of the franchisee on expiration of the contract (and usually termination). Expiration or termination usually triggers a postterm noncompetition clause that prohibits the franchisee from working in related businesses for a specified period of time and within a specified range of the outlet (or, in some cases, of any outlet in the system). Indeed, almost 89 percent of the contracts in the sample have a postterm noncompetition term of some sort. The average 29 The hostility that courts have shown to the lost profits measure of damages does not appear to be dampened by an express incorporation of that rule. For example, in Rocky Mountain Chocolate Factory, Inc. v. SDMS, Inc., the franchise agreement specified that, in the event of termination, "the Franchisor shall have the right to recover lost future Royalties during any period in which the Franchisee fails to pay such Royalties through and including the remainder of the then current term of this Agreement." 2009 WL 579516 (D. Colo.) (Mar. 4, 2009) . The court refused to enforce this provision because the franchisor was unable to demonstrate the costs it would have had to expend in order to earn the lost profits. length of the restriction is 1.8 years, with a standard deviation of 1.1 years. 31 Expiration of the contract often triggers a renewal option for the franchisee. About 80 percent of the contracts require the franchisor to renew the contract if the franchisee meets specified conditions such as being in good standing, updating the franchise outlet as required, and paying the renewal fee.
32
The contracts also specify certain characteristics of the franchise business model. Some franchises require the franchisee to devote full-time effort to the franchise, a requirement that restricts the ability to act as a passive investor. Thirty-three of the contracts contain this requirement, with some specifying a minimum number of hours that the franchisee must spend onsite, while others use an open-ended standard to articulate the obligation to operate the franchise. Over half the contracts-49 of them-provide the franchisee with an exclusive territory, which the agreements define through a variety of means such as a defined radius or by zipcode. These terms specify that the franchisor will not open a competing outlet within that defined territory, although there are occasional exceptions for company-operated outlets.
The franchise agreements typically end by specifying the rules for resolving disputes. Just over half the franchise contracts in the sample provide for arbitration over litigation in public courts, although almost all the agreements that opt for arbitration contain an exception that allows the franchisor the right to obtain an injunction if the franchisee violates any trademark rights. The contracts also specify the location of where any litigation or arbitration is to take place, which can sometimes vary based on who files the claim. For example, the forum will be at the election of the party filing the suit. In addition to these choice-of-forum clauses, the contracts also have choice-of-law provisions. These provisions overwhelmingly opt for the law of the franchisor's home state, with about 85 percent of the agreements containing such a clause. Table 5 presents a simple correlation matrix of some of the variables. The table shows a strong positive association between the presence of a liquidated damages clause and the average start-up costs of an outlet, as well as moderately negative associations between these damage clauses and the mandatory renewal of agreements and the use of arbitration. As one might expect, there is a negative association between the length of the contract term and the use of mandatory renewal, which are plausible substitutes for the optimal length of the relationship. As the franchisor gains more experience with the franchise model, there is a negative association with exclusive territories, an outcome that one might expect of a maturing franchise that may be running out of attractive options for exclusive outlets.
31
It is difficult to summarize the geographical scope of the postterm noncompetition agreements because the scales vary. Some prohibit competition within a specified range of miles from the outlet that the franchisee operated, some prohibit operating a similar business within the exclusive territory given to the franchisee, and some prohibit competition within the same county as the outlet.
32
Some states, such as Minnesota, prohibit franchisors from failing to renew an agreement unless there is good cause to terminate or unless the franchisee has been given an opportunity to continue to operate the outlet until the going concern value of the outlet has been recouped, as measured from the date of the decision not to renew the agreement. See Minn. Admin. Rules § 2860.4400(m). 
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II. Contract Damages in Franchise Agreements
A. Governance and the Economics of Franchising
An enduring puzzle in the structure of franchise relationships is the existence of franchisee rents and the queues they create. The right to operate a McDonald's, after accounting for all the franchise fees, royalty rates, the costs of establishing and operating the business, and the next-best opportunity of the franchisee, has been estimated to be worth about $300,000 to $455,000 in 1982 dollars. 33 As one might expect, there are long lines to receive what is, in essence, free money: acceptance rates to be a McDonald's franchisee are between 2 percent and 7.5 percent.
34 Economists wonder why a franchisor would give away that amount of money instead of making a franchisee pay for the right to receive these supra-competitive rents. Most of the explanations for this phenomenon draw on the incentive benefits that the rents may be able to provide, many of which overlap with the reasons why a firm may choose to franchise a given outlet rather than vertically integrate it into the firm. The literature has identified two mechanisms used in franchise contracts to create these incentive benefits: the right to residual profits of an individual outlet and the use of self-enforcing contracts that generate rents for franchisees.
34 By giving franchisees a right to the residual profits in an outlet, franchisors provide motivation for franchisees to expend a level of effort in operating the outlet that might be difficult to do via a salary, particularly if the amount of this effort is difficult to observe, but these residual claim rights are not an entirely satisfactory explanation because franchisors could still charge large up-front fees to capture the rents, while maintaining the residual claim structure to incentivize franchisees to exert effort. Moreover, these rights are relatively uninteresting from the legal side of contract theory because the contract terms that create and address these rights, such as the amount of the up-front franchise fee, the structure of the ongoing royalty fee, and the creation of audit rights, are straightforward to interpret and enforce.
35
The self-enforcing theory of the franchise contract, on the other hand, has more analytical traction and it implicates several issues that have been analyzed by those who study franchising and those who study relational governance more generally. The very need to create a contract that enforces itself through a combination of rent creation and the threat of termination is, in part, a consequence of the inability to draft a complete con- & Econ. 417, 420 (1994) . In 2008 dollars, the range is from $661K to $1.00M. Kaufman and Lafontaine estimate the rents by using a net present value approach and verify the results by looking at the prices at which existing franchise outlets have been transferred. 36 If a contract could specify the obligations of both parties with precision and could be enforced costlessly, there would be no need to worry about shirking by the franchisee because the contract could accommodate this concern, but specifying this level of detail is neither practical nor cost justified and, as a consequence, these contracts contain large gaps. Unless parties can devise mechanisms that effectively address this contractual risk, the ability to act opportunistically provided by these gaps could eclipse the gains from entering into the contract. 37 In the franchise context, the gaps in the contracts arise from the difficulty of specifying the types and levels of effort that the franchisee needs to expend. These interstices can allow the franchisee to act opportunistically by shirking on the effort required to maintain the quality and uniformity standards that the franchisor desiresbehavior that benefits the franchisee because it increases profitability by lowering costs and allows the franchisee to externalize the diminution in the value of the brand, which is largely borne by the franchisor and other franchisees.
Klein argues that franchisors use rents as a self-enforcement mechanism to counteract the incentive to free ride on brand capital that contractual gaps create. 38 The threat of termination, and the associated loss of the rents, gives the franchisee motivation to avoid shirking. Klein observes that franchise agreements can create these self-enforcing mechanisms both by including terms that create or increase rents and through terms that minimize the ability of the franchisee to shirk. He provides the example of a grant of an exclusive territory with clearly defined borders as a contract term that creates rents for a franchisee. This right gives franchisees an incentive to exert effort to develop business in their territories with an assurance that the franchisor is not going to appropriate those rents in the future by opening additional outlets. As an example of the terms that minimize the opportunities to shirk, he includes minimum levels of required expenditures on marketing budgets.
Klein uses a simple model to describe this self-enforcement mechanism. He defines the expected gain that a franchisee can receive from shirking on compliance as W 1 and the present value of the rent that franchisee earns as W 2 . A contract is self-enforcing when W W t t 2 1 > for every period t. W 2 should include the rents expected not just over the term of the contract, but also over the term of the relationship between the franchisee and the franchisor. Klein categorizes contract terms into those that affect the value of W 1 and those that affect the value of W 2 . In addition to terms like mandatory spending on local advertising, Klein places requirements such as minimum staffing levels and the purchase of inputs from specified suppliers in the former category. In the latter category, he includes terms and mechanisms such as the use of exclusive territories, the potential for expansion of the number of units owned by the franchisee, and mandatory contract renewal. Klein
36
For an extended analysis of the problems of incompleteness in franchise agreements, see Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 927 (1990) .
37
In the conventional story of incomplete contracting, the contractual risk created by the threat of opportunism can lead to vertical integration. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Mechanisms of Governance (1996) . 38 See Klein, supra note 18.
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argues that contractual incompleteness assures that W 1 will not equal zero, so franchise contracts must create some amount of rent for the contract to be self-enforcing. But franchisors are limited in the amount of rent they can credibly commit to because the possibility of vertical integration suggests that, at some point, the rents will be large enough to overcome the relative governance benefits associated with franchising.
39
B. Legal and Relational Governance: Damages Versus Informal Rewards and Punishments
A question that Klein does not address is why franchisors would prefer to use rents as a governance mechanism rather than, or in conjunction with, damages. Insofar as providing these rents is costly to franchisors, one would expect them to try and find ways to minimize the amount of additional compensation that they provide in order to prevent franchisee shirking. One alternative would be to include contract damages that a franchisee must pay the franchisor upon termination for cause. These damages should decrease the amount of rent that is necessary to prevent shirking because the threat of paying these damages should similarly decrease the incentive the franchisees have to cut corners. Put in terms of the simple self-enforcement model, the expected level of damages, D, should decrease the right-hand side of the equation:
Hence, these two mechanisms should be, to some extent, substitutes. The remainder of this section discusses the costs and benefits that are specific to damages and rents with an eye toward the literatures on franchising and relational governance.
Damages
To obtain a damage award, franchisors must prove an operational default that will permit termination of the franchise agreement and, depending on the type of damages specified in the contract, prove the amount of damages. Both steps can be expensive and uncertain. The franchise agreements typically give franchisees significant leeway before the franchisor can terminate for an operational default. Once a franchisor identifies a problem, such as dirty facilities or deviations from the franchise uniformity standards, the franchisee usually has an opportunity to cure the deficiency. After a specified number of violations, the franchisor has the right to terminate the contract, but franchisees often fight this decision in court and it can be difficult to prove the default to a court's satisfaction. This difficulty is readily apparent to franchisors-an in-house counsel for Hardee's explained: "It is easy to prove in court whether a franchisee has paid or not. It is really hard, though, to make an operational default stick. They might still be making $700,000 per year, so a judge will often not buy the argument that the operation is failing." 40 The Chief Operating Officer of 39 As Klein discusses, the use of franchising implies that the profitability of that model is larger than the integrated model or P F -P I > 0. Accordingly, the prospect of using rents as a means to enforce the contract is only credible
Jeffrey L. Bradach, Franchise Organizations 35 (1998).
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Badawi Jack in the Box put the matter more starkly: "You need a dead rat in the kitchen, and preferably three or four, if you want a chance of winning."
41
Once an operational default has been shown, there are two primary approaches to damages for termination: the default standard of expectation damages or the stipulation of a precise amount through a liquidated damages clause. There are very strong reasons to believe that-if franchisors are serious about using damages as a credible threat to govern franchisee behavior-they will opt for liquidated damages rather than expectation damages. 42 The expectation measure can be relatively simple to administer and enforce in situations where it only requires observation of the contract price and the market price, such as a buyer's breach in the sale of fungible goods. 43 However, in the context of franchising, the expectation measure poses a much more onerous evidentiary burden because it is difficult to discern the profits that the franchisor would have made had the contract been performed. Most franchise agreements have a fixed term, so the damage calculus would attempt to estimate the royalty payments that the franchisor would have received through the duration of the contract minus the costs that would be necessary to generate those profits and less any appropriate mitigation, such as finding a replacement franchisee.
44 Establishing these figures in court can be expensive because it will often require dueling experts and, even after all this effort, franchisors face hostility from courts when making lost profits claims. One obstacle is the certainty rule, which denies recovery when damage claims are unreasonably speculative. 45 Indeed, courts often reject claims by franchisors for expectation damages because the franchisors have not been able to show the 41 Id.
42
Practitioners writing on the subject appear to take a dim view of franchisors that wish to recover lost profits, yet rely on imprecise specifications of their desired remedy. See Ebe, Steinberg & Waxdeck, supra note 17, at 11 ("Franchisors that seek [lost profits] yet nonetheless persist, for whatever reason, in relying upon ambiguous language as to the remedy they want reduce the likelihood of achieving their goals.").
43
Richard Epstein has pointed out the ramifications of this mismatch between the appropriateness of the expectation measure when a buyer breaches and when a seller breaches. In the case of buyer breach, he argues that the expectation measure-the difference between the contract price and the market price-is necessary to promote efficiency, but in the case of seller breach, the expectation measure-insofar as it includes foreseeable consequential damages-can inflate the costs of contractual failure. Epstein shows that parties can and do opt out of the expectation rule for breach by the seller with alarming frequency. See Richard A. Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the Law of Contract, 18 J. Legal Stud. 105 (1989) . 44 The damages might also compensate the franchisor for the deficient performance of the franchisee by calculating the difference between the actual royalty payments prior to termination and the royalty payments that the franchisor would have received had the franchisee devoted appropriate effort. 45 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 352 (1981) ("Damages are not recoverable for loss beyond an amount that the evidence permits to be established with reasonable certainty."); cf. Saul Levmore, Stipulated Damages, SuperStrict Liability, and Mitigation in Contract Law, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1365 Rev. , 1371 Rev. -76 (2009 (arguing that the certainty rule promotes the stipulation of damages and that stipulation can encourage parties to bundle their private knowledge of potential damages and the savings from avoiding litigation over mitigation strategies into a specified amount of damages in the contract).
amount of lost profits with sufficient precision. 46 Other cases have rejected franchisor claims for lost profits as exploitative and unconscionable. 47 Threats to impose liquidated damages, in contrast, are more credible for two principal reasons. First, this measure poses little marginal cost. Once a franchisor has shown a permissible reason to terminate for cause, the imposition of liquidated damages is a straightforward application of the amount listed in the contract. 48 The expense of enforcing this type of provision pales in comparison to the evidentiary showing that would be necessary to establish damages under the expectation measure. 49 Second, courts have shown much more willingness to enforce liquidated damage terms in franchise contracts relative to expectation damages provisions and have identified the ease of application and the clarity of these terms as reasons that favor their enforcement. 50 Even when courts find that a liquidated damages term requires a franchisee to pay an unacceptable amount of money, they appear to reduce the level of damages to an acceptable level rather than bar any amount of damages, as happens with the application of the certainty rule to claims for 
47
The leading case in this vein is Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Sealy, 43 Cal. App. 4th 1704 (Ct. App. 1996 . The case involved breach of a franchise contract by the franchisee and claim for lost profits by the franchisor on the basis of a term in the agreement that entitled the franchisor to the "benefit of the bargain" in the event of a material breach. The court rejected the claim, inter alia, because such an award would render the agreement an "unconscionable and oppressive contract." Id. at 1718.
48
Most of the liquidated damages provisions in franchise contracts state a figure that is based on the average annual royalties paid in over the previous several years. Enforcing this type of term in court would require evidence of the prior royalties paid, but this showing would presumably be relatively straightforward. 49 Epstein makes this point in disputing the wisdom of the default rule for consequential damages in the context of breach by the seller. Where enormous liabilities can turn on the interpretation of standard contract terms, such as the consequential damages default, the associated litigation costs can scale with the liabilities. Consequently, one should expect to observe liquidated damage terms in this situation because they can dramatically decrease the expected litigation costs. See Epstein, supra note 43, at 117-18. 50 Courts enforce these liquidated damage provisions. See, e.g., Days Inn Worldwide, Inc. v. BFC Mgmt. Inc., 544 F. Supp. 2d 401, 406-07 (D.N.J. 2008) (enforcing a liquidated damages provision and noting that the clause is appropriate because actual damages would be difficult to assess); see also Radisson Hotels Int'l, Inc. v. Majestic Towers, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 953, 962-63 (C.D. Cal. 2007 ) (enforcing a liquidated damages term in a hotel franchise agreement and expressly distinguishing Sealy based on the distinction between the uncertain term at issue in that case and the precise liquidated damages term in the hotel contract).
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Badawi expectation damages. 51 The combination of these effects strongly suggests that if franchisors want to use contract damages to counteract the potential gains from shirking-and as a means of minimizing the rents that help to prevent that shirking-they will use liquidated damages rather than rely on the default rule.
There are, however, reasons why franchisors may decline to include liquidated damages terms despite the governance advantages they provide. Just as there may be potential franchisees who dislike at-will termination clauses, liquidated damages terms may make it more difficult to recruit franchisees. For example, those potential franchisees who are particularly risk averse may shy away from franchisors that include liquidated damages clauses because they fear that a failed venture plus a damages judgment would be too large a loss to sustain. Moreover, liquidated damages may not be all that effective as a deterrent to shirking if the franchisees are judgment proof. When franchisees are deficient in their payments to franchisors and do not have the resources to pay the amounts owing, the further threat of liquidated damages is of little consequence. The bevy of default judgments against franchisees who fail to show up to court attests to these difficulties.
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The relational governance literature provides some other reasons for why franchisors may shy away from damages. The structure of the franchisor-franchisee relationship resembles the experiments that researchers have conducted on the interaction between formal and informal means of governance. In those studies, subjects typically make decisions in the context of a principal-agent relationship that involves some contractible elements and some noncontractible elements. Likewise, in the franchise arrangement, the franchisor and franchisee have a principal-agent relationship and are able to contract precisely over some elements-such as the length of the agreement and the amount of royalty payments-but cannot specify the details of other elements of the relationshipsuch as the precise expectations with regard to quality and cleanliness in the outlets. The experiments allow subjects to enforce penalties and rewards through contracts and also provide informal means to punish and reward transacting partners through, for example, the decision to engage in another transaction. Franchisors face some version of this choice. They can pursue contractual penalties, including an award of damages, and they may also use informal rewards and punishments, such as awarding or withholding a new outlet to a franchisee.
The experimental studies in this area find varying degrees of support for the "crowdout" hypothesis. In one prominent study, Fehr and Gächter conduct a trust game where the Feb. 5, 2009 ) at *9-10 (finding a liquidated damages provision that required the franchisee to pay the fixed fees for the remaining term of the contract valid, but severing the portion that allowed the franchisor to round up the liquidated damages to a full calendar year for the year of termination, i.e., though there were only about six and one-third years remaining on the contract, the liquidated damages provision allowed the franchisor to collect seven years of payments-the court found this rounding up to be impermissible and only allowed damages for the approximately six and one-third years remaining on the contract). 
Relational Governance and Contract Damages
control group has no resort to contractual penalties and, instead, must rely on informal sanctions to regulate the amount of effort that the sellers expend. 53 Even though the incentives of the experiment encourage buyers to offer low prices and sellers to expend no effort, a substantial number of buyers offer generous prices and a significant number of sellers expend effort. The treatment group has the option to use contractual sanctions and the authors find that this option results in lower prices from buyers and lower amounts of effort expended by sellers. This is the "crowd-out" effect-the presence of formal sanctions reduces the amount of informal reciprocity and diminishes overall outcomes in cooperative games. This result has been replicated and refined in other contexts that resemble the principal-agent relationship. Frey and Benz find that the "crowd-out" effect can extend to areas that are not regulated by formal incentives. 54 The study uses a variant of the trust game that begins with the principal offering a contract and then allows agents to choose the level of effort and the level of quality that they wish to commit to the endeavor. The study includes a trust condition that does not provide any formal incentive mechanism and an incentive treatment that allows principals to impose a formal penalty on the effort dimension. The authors show that the incentive mechanism tends to decrease what the agent chooses to expend on effort-the contractible dimension-and on quality-the noncontractible dimension. This result suggests that the "crowd-out" effect can spill over to other areas of exchange between principals and agents that are not subject to formal incentive mechanisms.
There may also be a specific effect that comes with putting a price on the cost of breach, as liquidated damages clauses do. In a well-known study, Gneezy and Rustichini show that the introduction of a penalty for parents who arrive late to pick up their children from day-care produces an increase in the amount of tardiness. 55 The authors speculate that the penalty provides information about the missing terms in the incomplete contract between the day-care providers and the parents. In the absence of the penalty term, parents might assume that the consequence for lateness is more grave than the small penalty, but once the parents learn this term, the uncertainty has been removed and, given the small consequences, this knowledge increases the amount of lateness. It is unlikely that this sort of dynamic plays out in the franchise context because liquidated damages impose significant liability and the alternative-the difficult-to-enforce default of expectation damages-is more of a known quantity. Subsequent work, however, has illuminated the specific role that liquidated damages can play in the propensity to breach. Wilkinson-Ryan shows that when experimental subjects are presented with an expectation damages clause and a liquidated damages provision, those given a liquidated damages 
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Badawi provision are more likely to breach a contract.
56 She attributes this effect to two mechanisms. First, liquidated damages provisions cue parties to think about breach in a way that does not invoke the norm of following through on promises. Second, the liquidated damages clause may provide information that a counterparty takes a dim view of social norms about promises.
Even with the evidence that liquidated damages provisions can promote breach at a higher rate and may undermine willingness to act cooperatively along noncontractible dimensions, one has to be careful in generalizing to the franchise context. The stakes of this relationship relative to the stakes in experimental studies are much higher. These larger consequences may orient parties toward strict economic calculations and, as discussed above, there are a number of purely economic reasons why franchisees may disfavor liquidated damages provisions. Nevertheless, some of the qualitative work on franchising resonates with the finding that shifting the orientation from a relational, trust-based understanding to a more purely economic one can have adverse consequences. 57 The most common metaphor for the relationship between a franchisor and franchisee is another trust-dependent relationship: marriage. One director of franchising at a chain explained, "I equate the relationship to a successful marriage. Communication is key."
58 As one might expect in a relationship that requires trust, threats to enforce legal rights can alter the nature of how parties expect to treat each other in the future. A director of franchising at Hardee's remarked that "[y]ou know you're in trouble if you have to refer to the contract." 59 To the degree that these characterizations are correct, it is possible that including a liquidated damages provision in a contract could undermine formation of a relationship where the parties trust each other not to exploit gaps in the contract, much like the stipulation of a divorce payout in a premarital agreement might alter the nature of a marriage.
The data in this study cannot differentiate between the purely economic explanations for why an agreement might not contain a liquidated damages provision-such as a strong franchisee preference against them-and reasons associated with relational governancesuch as a concern that a liquidated damages provision will undermine a trust-based relationship between the parties. The data can, however, provide evidence that cuts against the hypothesis that credible uses of formal sanctions can bolster the use of informal mechanisms. Perhaps the strongest experimental showing of this result is a study by Lazzarini, There is some empirical evidence that the degree of the "crowd-out" effect depends on the strength of the personal relationship between agents and principals. See Harry G. Barkema, Do Top Managers Work Harder When They Are Monitored? 48 Kyklos 19 (1995) (finding a positive association between monitoring and work performance when the employer-employee relationship is impersonal and a negative association when the relationship is a closer one). 
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Miller, and Zenger. 60 The authors use an experimental design that allows subjects to choose formal or informal means to structure a transaction with contractible and noncontractible elements. The treatments vary within subjects with regard to the likelihood that a given buyer and seller will transact again in the future and between subjects with regard to the cost of contracting. The authors show that when the probability that buyers and sellers will interact again is low, contracts do much to increase the willingness of buyers to enter into transactions. The data on sellers demonstrate that contracts can facilitate the selfenforcement of the noncontractible elements of a transaction. The authors find evidence that price levels set by buyers facilitate reciprocity in a nonlinear manner, but they do not find evidence for the "crowd-out" hypothesis that the ability to use enforceable contracts will substitute for informal self-enforcement. The authors conclude that low-cost contracts are particularly important in environments where parties are not likely to transact again in the future.
The Lazzarini, Miller, and Zenger study shows, at a minimum, that "crowding out" is not a universal effect in experimental conditions, but this study can be readily distinguished from the typical franchise arrangement. In this setting, the principal and the agent agree to form what is likely to be a long-term relationship that involves an assurance of repeated interaction going forward. This relationship differs from the primary features of the Lazzarini, Miller, and Zenger study, which focuses on relationships that are not likely to involve repeated interaction and where the dynamic depends, in part, on whether the parties choose to use a contract at all. Indeed, some of the experimental evidence has shown that as parties interact more over time, the substitution effect becomes stronger as parties increasingly trust one another and, hence, are able to rely more on informal mechanisms of governance. 61 Provided that franchisors know that franchise relationships can be expected to last a long time and given that liquidated damages provisions have been shown to harden parties' approaches to breach, one should expect these provisions to act as a substitute rather than as a complement insofar as relational dynamics are at work in the franchise context.
Informal Rewards and Punishments
Knowing that there may be potential downsides of using liquidated damages, franchisors may find it more cost effective to govern franchisees by providing rents and threatening to take them away. This is an approach suggested by the modern contract scholarship that examines the problems that arise when parties can easily observe contract performance, but the verification of that behavior is costly. This is a plausible depiction of the principal-agent problem in franchising-franchisors may be able to observe shirking with relative ease, but it may be difficult for them to perform the verification that would be necessary to terminate the contract for cause. 
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Badawi franchisees who they observe shirking through extra-legal means that do not require verification, 62 they may prefer these mechanisms if they turn out to be more cost effective than the expense that comes with using liquidated damages as a governance mechanism.
Using rents to govern franchisees can take the form of either offering future rewards or threatening future punishments. One prominent reward is permission to open an additional outlet, which can substantially increase the earnings of a franchisee. Qualitative studies of franchisors suggest that this mechanism may be among the most important tools available to police franchisee behavior. A history of McDonald's discusses Ray Kroc's early recognition of this mechanism and explains: "By retaining the right to determine whether a franchisee is to be granted a license to operate a second store and then another, McDonald's also retained the only carrot it could use to motivate a franchisee to follow the system's rules on quality, service, cleanliness, and value." 63 A franchise consultant to Hardee's echoes this sentiment: "Growth is the real lever of control we have. Two of the franchisees I have [of eight] are not qualified to grow until they resolve some outstanding issues." 64 The promise of this reward functions as a rent-as long as the net present value of the income from additional potential outlets is larger than the gain from shirking, franchisees should invest the desired effort.
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Franchisors also have a way to take away rents through noncontractual punishments. For example, when franchises do not provide exclusive territories, the threat of opening a nearby outlet can provide powerful motivation for a franchisee. 66 In these situations, the expected future rent that comes from the lack of nearby competition can incentivize franchisees not to shirk. This option is, however, not particularly effective if the franchise agreement gives franchisees exclusive territories. Unless the size of the territory is quite small, there are limits on the threat of nearby competition, as previous theory has 62 By extra-legal, I mean governance mechanisms that do not require the enforcement, or the threat of enforcement, of the written contract between the two parties. Academics have viewed the model of multiunit ownership with some suspicion because it is difficult to understand how it provides an advantage over single-outlet ownership. If franchising is appealing because it improves the incentives to exert effort, why would the separation of ownership and control for the franchisee who owns multiple units be more desirable than single-unit ownership, particularly when this format dilutes the earnings stream because it must be divided among the franchisor, the multiunit owning franchisee, and the manager that emphasized. 67 Where the agreement does not provide for exclusive territories, however, a franchisor could, in theory, open an outlet right next door to a shirking franchisee and this threat is likely to prevent the undesirable behavior.
Franchise-Specific Issues in the Choice Between Formal and Informal Governance
Whether franchisors use formal or informal punishments should depend on the relative effectiveness of these two strategies and the costs of supplying each mechanism. If informal rewards can be supplied at low cost, franchisors should prefer them because they can economize on verification costs and do not face the problem of ineffectiveness due to judgment-proof franchisees, but these rewards will not always be cheap and, because they require franchisors to give up revenue, damages may sometimes be the least-expensive governance mechanism.
Franchises that do not require franchisees to invest in a high amount of specific assets face a unique problem in choosing between contract damages and relational governance.
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This is a common difficulty when the relationship limits the franchisor's obligations to providing marketing services. In the hotel and motel industry, for example, the franchisees typically own the real estate and are responsible for the management of the property. The franchisor's tasks in these situations are generally limited to promoting the brand and providing a reservation system that sends customers to the franchisee. This structure makes it relatively simple for the franchisee to switch to another franchisor-a practice known in the industry as reflagging-because most of the assets owned by the franchisee can be easily redeployed to another franchise system. 69 Real estate franchises are similar; the franchisor mostly provides marketing and branding services, which allows the agent to switch franchises quite easily. Contrast this situation to the fast-food context where franchisees must make substantial specific investments in fixtures and equipment that cannot be easily redeployed in another system.
For those franchises that do not require substantial specific investments, the appeal of using informal rewards to govern behavior will be diminished because the threat of withdrawing these rewards will be limited by the ability of the franchisee to defect to another system. 70 Take, for example, the possibility of punishing franchisees that shirk by 67 Some franchise agreements condition the continued right to an exclusive territory on the franchisee meeting minimum performance standards. This mechanism provides franchisors with a more potent threat over franchisees insofar as the performance standards accurately measure shirking.
Asset specificity is the concept that an asset may have more value within a particular relationship than outside of that relationship. Use of highly specific assets is pervasive in franchising. Take, for example, a statue of Colonel Sanders. Within a KFC franchise relationship, this item may be an effective marketing tool, but once the relationship has ended, it is a worthless piece of kitsch. Some franchise assets, however, may be more fungible; the furniture in a hotel room is roughly as valuable outside a franchise relationship as it is within one. Indeed, one study of residential real estate brokerages argues that franchisors are able to extract the rents from their franchisees based on evidence that there is no difference in net profitability between franchised and freestanding 768 Badawi opening nearby outlets. If a franchisee can jump to another franchise at little cost, the threat of a nearby outlet may not be effective because it will not cause that large a loss in future revenue. The possibility of cheap exit should limit the overall effectiveness of rent as a governance mechanism and may leave liquidated damages as the only effective alternative. Indeed, one study of real estate brokerages shows that franchised outlets are no more profitable than individual outlets, which suggests that the franchisors are not supplying rents. This evidence is consistent with the data here, which show prevalent use of liquidated damages provisions in real estate franchise contracts. 71 An additional theoretical point relates to the literature that has tied the amount of repeat business that an outlet receives to the incentive that franchisees have to externalize the costs of shirking. Cleaning and hair-cutting franchises, for example, may not be able to externalize the cost of shirking because these businesses rely on repeat clientele-if these businesses skimp on maintaining quality they will be at substantial risk of decreased profitability. Other businesses, like fast-food outlets and roadside motels, tend to rely more on transient customers who are unlikely to return to an individual outlet. This feature may allow franchisees in these sectors to do more relative shirking because they will not lose much future business as a consequence. Brickley has collected data on this facet of franchising and groups sectors into low-externality franchises and high-externality franchises on the basis of these results. 72 This ability to externalize costs has straightforward implications for the self-enforcement model-franchisees who can more easily externalize the costs of shirking have a stronger incentive to withhold effort than those franchisees who rely on repeat business.
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The potential for increased gains in high-externality industries suggests that the rents provided by franchisors need to be higher for the self-enforcement mechanism to work. But this increased incentive to shirk should not necessarily have a strong effect on the relative propensity to use liquidated damages because the choice to use this mechanism depends on how it compares to other potential means of governance. If a franchisor has concerns about externality issues and there are cheap rents available to address this problem, there is little reason to observe the use of liquidated damages. At most, externality problems should affect the use of liquidated damages by creating governance problems that otherwise would not exist. Imagine a hypothetical firm that rapidly transitions from low-externality conditions to high-externality conditions, with all other variables remaining the same. If, prior to 745, 748-50 (1999) (explaining the hypothesis that the ability to externalize costs will generate more shirking and should result in the use of prohibitions on passive ownership, the use of area development plans, and mandatory advertising expenditures).
There can, of course, be substantial variation in the ability to externalize within any given franchise system. Brickley uses the example of a fast-food restaurant that is near a large factory and whose clientele is made up largely of factory employees. See id. at 755. this shift, the franchisees had little to gain from shirking, the firm would have to assess the relative merits of the mechanisms that could address this new governance challenge. In this situation, one might observe a decision to use liquidated damages, but that is only because the externality issue created a new problem that had to be addressed-this problem would not, however, convert liquidated damages into a more effective means of governance relative to other alternatives.
III. Empirical Evidence of the Relationship Between Contractual Threats and Relational Governance
This section uses the theory developed in Section II to develop a series of general hypotheses about the relationship between the threat of contract damages and the use of more informal approaches to govern the franchisor-franchisee relationship. These hypotheses provide the basis for a regression model that uses the presence of a liquidated damages provision in a franchise agreement as the dependent variable. After specifying this model, this section discusses the likely signs of the independent variables in the regressions and then turns to the results of these regressions.
A. The Choice of Governance Mechanisms
The Klein model, even with the incorporation of damages into it, looks only at the decision faced by the franchisee. This section builds on that model to take into account the factors that affect the franchisee's incentive to shirk vis-à-vis the franchisor's costs of altering the franchisee's decision calculus. The basic problem, as is common in principal-agent models, is that the franchisor benefits from the franchisee investing in costly effort. Franchisors may use legal incentives, nonlegal punishments and rewards, or some combination of these approaches to induce franchisee effort. Using legal incentives can be expensive in the franchise context because the agreements typically obligate a franchisor to show cause for termination in order to receive a damage award against the franchisee. The informal rewards and punishments can be less expensive to use because they do not entail the verification costs associated with legal process, but these mechanisms are not without some cost. 74 In particular, the use of rewards-such as providing extra-competitive levels of compensation-can be expensive, but an important source of variation among franchisors is the cost of providing rewards. For example, brands that have large exogenous demand can grow their networks in ways that would be difficult for those with more stagnant demand. These growing franchises need to recruit franchisees for new outlets and the ability to draw on the existing pool of franchisees allows firms not only to economize on 74 It can be difficult to distinguish between rewards and punishments because a punishment can often be the withholding of a reward. For example, if franchisors roll out popular new products to franchisees who exert more effort, one could characterize that as a reward, but it might also serve as a punishment to those who do not receive initial access to the new products.
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Badawi costs, but to use these new outlets as an informal reward. This option would be more expensive for a stagnant franchise to use because it does not have the demand to warrant new outlets without drawing business away from existing outlets. This phenomenon suggests that franchises that can supply informal rewards and punishments are more likely to use these techniques to induce effort relative to franchises for which these approaches are more expensive.
To the degree that a firm can use legal damages at low cost, this option should be attractive because it can decrease the amount of informal rewards that a firm has to offer franchisees to induce effort, but beyond the costs of enforcement, damages may be difficult to use for other reasons. Franchisees may have limited financial abilities to satisfy a damage award and, for the purposes of using a legal threat to induce effort, may be judgment proof. In this situation, franchisees will not perceive damages as a credible threat because they will not have to pay them. This limits the ability of franchisors to use damages as an option and means that they will have to seek other means of influencing franchisee behavior. If a large number of franchisees are judgment proof, one should expect, all other things being equal, that franchisors will be more likely to use informal mechanisms of governance. An additional concern for franchisors is the potentially negative consequences of using liquidated damages. Insofar as potential franchisees would prefer agreements that do not have liquidated damages provisions, the use of these clauses may repel high-quality franchisees. 75 The relational governance literature suggests an additional potential problem with liquidated damages provisions-they may antagonize franchisees in a way that undermines the reciprocity norm. If this effect exists, the use of these clauses may diminish the amount of effort that franchisees exert because they view the relationship in a more legalistic rather than trust-based way. Both reasons suggest that if liquidated damages provisions are unlikely to provide a governance benefit, franchisors may refrain from using them.
These arguments about the likely role of damages can be combined to generate a group of hypotheses about the factors that are likely to affect governance decisions.
1. All else equal, the inability of franchisees to pay damage awards should reduce reliance on liquidated damages provisions. 2. All else equal, franchisors that can supply informal punishments and rewards at low cost should make less use of liquidated damages provisions. 3. All else equal, lower costs of verifying that franchisees have not invested effort should reduce the use of informal rewards as a governance mechanism.
To isolate these effects, I estimate both a linear probability model and a logit model.
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The most inclusive linear probability model takes the following form:
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One could argue that high-quality franchisees might prefer liquidated damages provisions because they provide a means to deter low-quality franchisees from shirking, which should increase the brand capital of the franchise. The failure of an outlet is not, however, perfectly correlated with the effort of the franchisee. A motel may fail, for example, when a highway is rerouted despite the best efforts of the franchisee. Given this prospect, even high-quality franchisees may be reticent to enter into agreements that could subject them to a large damages award.
where Yf indicates whether the contract for franchisor f contains a liquidated damages term, the Xf term contains external and control variables for franchisor f, the Wf term contains business model variables for franchisor f, the Zf term contains contract variables for franchisor f, and ef is an error term for franchisor f. The external variables include those factors that are not specified in the contract such as the natural log of the average start-up costs, the growth rate of franchised outlets from 2004 to 2006, and the number of years the franchisor has been franchising. The controls include indicator variables for the fast-food industry and the cleaning industry, the two most common industry types in the sample. The business model variables code the structural features of the franchise that are specified in the contract such as the "must operate" requirement and whether the franchise uses exclusive territories. The contract variables include rights and remedies provided under the contract such as the length of the term, mandatory renewal, and whether the contract gives the franchisor the option to purchase franchise-related assets from the franchisee on termination or expiration of the contract.
B. Expected Signs of the Coefficients
External Variables a. Log of Start-Up Costs.
The start-up costs should be positively associated with the presence of liquidated damage terms insofar as they are a measure of whether a franchisee is likely to be judgment proof. 77 This prediction assumes that the ability to pay larger start-up costs is an indication of relative financial strength and, hence, shows a higher likelihood of being able to satisfy a judgment. Moreover, franchises that involve relatively high start-up costssuch as motels, automotive repair shops, and some restaurants-involve significant investment in fixtures and other hard assets that can be attached to satisfy judgments. As franchisees are better able to pay damage awards, the use of damages should be more attractive to franchisors because it allows them to avoid paying rents to induce effort. Conversely, the inability to pay damage awards dilutes the power of this threat to deter and should, consequently, make the use of rents attractive.
The ability to finance start-up costs may mute the association between start-up costs and the financial strength of the franchisee because the use of debt may mask the relatively of a liquidated damage provision that are negative and more than 1. Limited dependent variable models have been critiqued for being "artificial and unnecessarily elaborate." See Angus Deaton, The Analysis of Household Surveys 85-92 (1997) . I report results from both a linear probability model and a logit model and I provide the marginal logit effects for ease of comparison between the two.
77
The disclosure documents sometimes omit the expected real estate costs associated with a franchise so I back out the real estate costs for all the franchises for consistency. Taking out these costs presumably biases the coefficients toward 0 insofar as ownership of the land or the ability to obtain financing for the land indicates an ability to satisfy a judgment.
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Badawi weak financial position of the franchisee, but the decision whether to finance is likely to be based on the concerns that mirror the ability to satisfy judgments such as the franchisee's assets and creditworthiness. 78 Financing may also weaken the connection between start-up costs and financial strength of the franchisor because lending institutions factor in the strength of a franchise's brand in the decision whether to provide a loan. But if one assumes that brand strength grows with time, the inclusion of years franchising in the equation should control for this effect. [2004] [2005] [2006] . The growth rate for the number of franchise outlets should be negatively related to the use of liquidated damages. For the lure of an additional outlet to be effective as a reward for franchisees, there must be additional outlets available. If a franchise has matured, the use of awards of additional outlets to incentivize franchisees is more difficult because, presumably, the market for outlets is close to saturation. The inability to use this sort of governance mechanism at low cost, all other things equal, should drive franchisors to use alternatives such as liquidated damages. Where, however, franchisors are experiencing growth, the use of this mechanism is particularly attractive because not only does it provide the governance benefit of inducing franchise effort, it economizes on the costs of screening franchisees.
b. Franchise Outlet Growth Rate for
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There is, of course, a question of why the franchisor who can cheaply provide additional outlets would not also use a liquidated damages clause. As addressed in Section II.B.1, there are both economic and relational reasons to believe that the use of a credible damages threat imposes a cost. The damages may turn away potential franchisees and, to the degree the substitution effect is at work, these ex ante threats may incline franchisees to shirk on those aspects of the agreement that are difficult to verify. As long as the use of a liquidated damage clause imposes some cost, one would expect their absence when franchisors have the potentially cheaper option of providing additional outlets.
c. Years Franchising. There are two main reasons to believe this variable will have a negative relationship with the use of liquidated damages provisions, although they are not overwhelmingly strong. First, increased experience in franchising may allow franchisors to reduce the monitoring costs associated with relational governance. For example, once firms have decades worth of financial data on an increasing number of outlets, they may be able to estimate the amount of effort that franchisees are expending on the basis of monthly reports. They may also be able to fine tune the relational rewards and punishments that they use to induce franchisee effort. For example, they may perfect the ability to target advertising spending to drive business to favor franchisees. This sort of expertise, however, should only decrease the use of liquidated damages provisions if there is not a concurrent decrease in the costs of verifying a franchisee's lack of effort. It could be the case that 78 The International Franchising Association claims that lenders typically require franchisees to provide about a third of the total start-up capital needed to start a franchise in order to approve a loan. See <http://www.franchise.org/ franchiseesecondary.aspx?id=10004>.
See Bradach, supra note 40.
Relational Governance and Contract Damages franchisors are able, over time, to improve the data collection that is necessary to verify breach of the franchise agreement. If the costs of both types of monitoring are falling, there may be no reason to favor one type of governance mechanism over the other. One suspects, however, that the relative costs of observing a lack of effort fall more quickly than the costs of verifying that lack of effort. The former can be done through analysis of aggregated data, while verification will tend to require individual site visits that can form the basis for witness testimony, should litigation arise. For this reason, experience might result in a preference for relational governance over liquidated damages provisions.
Second, there may be relational reasons to believe that more experience results in more use of informal means of governance. Gulati argues that when transactional partners repeatedly interact over time, trust develops between these partners and, consequently, there is less need to rely on formal contractual structures. 80 To the degree that more time spent franchising means that there are more long-term relationships in a franchisor's network, there may be a larger number of trusting relationships that can minimize the need for formal punishments. This argument is consistent with the experimental evidence showing that when subjects interact in a principal-agent context their reliance on informal mechanisms of control increases over time. It is unclear what effect "must-operate" clauses will have on the use of liquidated damages. These clauses will tend to lower the opportunity costs associated with failing to invest effort or, put in terms of the self-enforcement model, these clauses decrease the gain from shirking. 82 The effect is difficult to predict because this decreased incentive to shirk does not say much about the relative benefits of using damages and of using informal governance. The smaller amount of damages that are necessary to deter shirking in the presence of a "must-operate" clause may make this approach appealing, but if a franchisor can already supply rents at low cost, there is little reason to think that a "must-operate" clause would promote a shift to damages.
b. Exclusive Territories. Providing franchisees with exclusive territories is likely to have ambiguous effects on the use of liquidated damages because both the presence and absence of exclusive territories allow a franchisor to rely on mechanisms that do not require enforcement of the contract. The use of exclusive territories can function as a carrot because it provides franchisees rents through the guarantee that future business growth in the area will not be appropriated by the franchisor, 83 
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Badawi also enables relational governance because it allows franchisors to use the threat of opening nearby outlets if a franchisee has been observed shirking. 84 The increased use of rents should be correlated with diminished use of liquidated damages, but the threat of opening additional outlets close to a shirking franchisee-which the use of exclusive territories inhibits-should also be associated with a diminished use of liquidated damages.
To attempt to identify these two effects I use an interaction term in a second set of regressions. The interaction term is the product of a binary variable that equals 1 if a franchise does not use exclusive territories and 0 otherwise and the number of years franchising. In theory, this variable should be an indication of a franchisor's ability to use its monitoring experience and expertise to use nearby competition to punish franchisors if the contract permits them to use this mechanism. With this control, both the exclusive territory variable and the interaction effect should be negative because they are both indications of an ability to use relational means to control franchisee behavior.
Contract Variables
a. Duration of the Contract. Long contract terms and mandatory renewal of contract terms should minimize the need for more formal types of governance. If franchisors provide rents to franchisees to prevent shirking, franchisees should compare the net present value of shirking to the net present value of the future rents when deciding whether to invest effort. Extending the term of an agreement increases the net present value of rents because the franchisee has an assurance that the relationship will endure for a longer amount of time. Likewise, mandatory renewal increases the timeframe associated with the relationship and should increase the net present value of expected rents. Including both these variables in the regressions would be problematic because a longer contract term is a substitute for a shorter-term contract with a mandatory renewal clause, so the variables may not be an accurate measure of the expected length of the relationship. A proper measure would also account for the discounting of rents that are in the future. To capture these two effects, I construct a variable that takes the natural log of the sum of the contract term and the interaction of the contract term and the mandatory renewal dummy variable.
b. Arbitration Clause. The effect of an arbitration clause on the use of liquidated damages provisions is not clear. In a study of the use of arbitration in franchise contracts, Drahozal and Hylton find that franchisors prefer arbitration not because of the dispute resolution cost savings it may provide, but because it is an effective means of avoiding the overdeterrence that can come with the use of regular courts in high-litigation jurisdictions. 85 The relevant metric in their study is a comparison of the amount and severity of the likely lawsuits that will arise if the parties use regular courts versus those that will arise if the parties use arbitration. Similarly, one should expect arbitration clauses to matter for the use of liquidated damage clauses if courts and arbitrators tend to treat these clauses differently, 84 See Smith II, supra note 66. 
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but there is little reason to believe that this will be the case. As a general matter, courts are receptive to the liquidated damage clauses in franchise agreements and tend to enforce them. Insofar as arbitration is more likely to result in enforcement of the express terms of the contract, this forum should not provide a relative advantage if courts are inclined to enforce these provisions accurately.
C. Regression Results
The regression results provide evidence that credible legal threats and informal mechanisms of governance act as substitutes. Table 6 reports the OLS coefficient estimates for four specifications of the model and reports the marginal logit effects for the same four specifications, all of which use the presence of a liquidated damages term as the dependent variable. The first two specifications include all the observations and the last two specifications omit motel and real estate brokerage franchises as a robustness check because the observations in the sample from these industries almost all use liquidated damages provisions. The first and third specifications use only the external variables and the second and fourth specifications include the business model variables, the contract variables, and the industry controls. 86 For the continuous variables, the coefficients from the linear probability models can be interpreted as the estimated percentage change in the likelihood of observing a liquidated damages clause for every unit change in the independent variable with all other independent variables held constant. The coefficients on the binary variables from the linear probability models can be understood as the estimated percentage change in the likelihood of observing a liquidated damages term with a discrete change in the variable from 0 to 1 with all the other independent variables held constant. The marginal logit effects have been evaluated at the mean of each variable. The coefficients on continuous variables can be understood as the estimated likelihood of observing a liquidated damages provision given a small change in the independent variable with all other variables held at their means. The coefficients on the binary variables can be understood as the estimated effect on the likelihood of observing a liquidated damages provision given a discrete change in the variable from 0 to 1 with all other variables held at their means. For ease of exposition, I will largely confine the discussion to the results of the linear probability model, with occasional mention of the logit model where the results differ in a material way.
The start-up cost variable is statistically significant at the 1 percent level in all four of the linear probability specifications. With all the observations, the coefficient ranges from 86 There is a potential endogeneity concern with including the contract variables on the right-hand side of the equation because these variables could be jointly determined with the use of liquidated damages. As a check for endogeneity, some researchers have used pair-wise bivariate probits with the contract variable of interest and the other binary contract terms as dependent variables and the external variables as independent variables. See Drahozal & Hylton, supra note 24. This approach provides a test of whether the disturbance terms for the two equations are correlated. I performed this check for the must-operate, exclusive territory, and arbitration clause variables and in all cases the value of rho was not statistically significantly different than 0, so the results fail to reject the null hypothesis that the disturbance terms are uncorrelated. .250
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Notes: The dependent variable is a binary variable for the presence of a liquidated damages provision in the franchise contract. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels respectively. The logit marginal effects do not include the cleaning industry dummy variable because that variable perfectly predicts the absence of a liquidated damages clause.
0.1509 to 0.1864, and without the motel and real estate franchises, which use liquidated damage clauses at high rates, the range drops to 0.1278 to 0.1464. Because the variable is in log form, the coefficient can be interpreted in percentage terms-the model suggests that doubling the average start-up cost can be expected to result in about a 13 percent to 18 percent increase in the chance of observing a liquidated damages provision. The consistent significance of this result provides support for the hypothesis that as franchisees become less judgment proof or as the stakes of the relationship justify the verification costs, franchisors are more likely to use liquidated damages to police franchisees. The results also provide evidence for the theory that informal rewards are substitutes for the use of liquidated damages clauses. The variable most closely associated with the ability to use rents that do not require verification, the rate of growth in franchise outlets, has consistently negative coefficients and is statistically significant under all specifications of the model in Table 6 . The coefficient on the growth rate variable (expressed as a simple ratio) ranges from -0.0003 to -0.0004, which means that if all the other variables are held constant, doubling the two-year rate of growth is associated with a drop of roughly 3 to 4 percentage points in the likelihood of observing a liquidated damages provision.
87 Note that the effect is substantially larger in the logit model, where it varies from -0.0006 to -0.0009 and is statistically significant in all specifications. This result suggests that the availability of new outlets to use as rewards for franchisees that invest effort decreases the need to use liquidated damages to enhance the penalty associated with termination. The results also provide support for the view that increased experience leads to less reliance on contract damages. The coefficient for years franchising varies between -0.0077 and -0.0081 with all the observations and -0.0072 and -0.0080 with motels and real estate franchises omitted. 88 This result implies that with other variables held constant, an additional year of franchising experience is associated with about a 0.9 to 0.7 percentage point drop in the likelihood of observing a liquidated damages provision. This outcome provides some support for the contention that increased experience provides a drop in the monitoring costs associated with informal governance relative to those monitoring costs required to pursue contract damages. The results also provide some evidence that the existence of longer-term relationships within a franchise network may facilitate more reliance on informal trust as a substitute for formal contract damages.
The length of contract term variable has a consistently negative coefficient, but it is only significant in the complete specifications with all observations and only at the 10 percent level. These results provide mild evidence that longer contract terms are associated with a substitution away from the use of liquidated damages terms. The must-operate clause is significant only in the full specification of the logit model, albeit at the 5 percent level. This result and the consistently negative coefficients provide slight evidence that dimin-87 This effect may seem small, but recall that some of the firms are growing at explosive rates that can exceed 1,500 percent.
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This variable is not statistically significant in the final logit specification. This eighth specification fares relatively poorly; the proportionate reduction in error is zero, meaning one could correctly classify the same number of observations by using the modal observation of no liquidated damages provision.
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Badawi ished opportunity costs for franchisees is associated with reduced use of liquidated damages provisions. The arbitration clause variable is not significant under any specification, which suggests that the choice of interpretive forum does not have a discernable association with the use of liquidated damages provisions.
The exclusive territory variable is not significant under any of the specifications in Table 6 . This result is consistent with the hypothesis that exclusive territories have an ambiguous effect on the use of liquidated damages. If franchisors only used exclusive territories as a mechanism to provide rents for franchisees, one would expect this variable to be negative and significant. If, however, the lack of exclusive territories allows franchisees to use the threat of opening a nearby outlet, this effect should diminish the degree to which the use of exclusive territories serves as a substitute for contract damages. In an attempt to isolate this effect, I interact a dummy variable that equals 1 if a franchisor does not use exclusive territories and equals 0 otherwise with the variable for the number of years franchising. In theory, this interaction effect should provide a measure of the ability to punish franchisees by opening nearby outlets or directing business to nearby outlets. Including this variable in the full specification from Table 6 results in negative and significant coefficients for both the exclusive territory variable and the interaction term, as the theory suggests. The interaction term is, however, collinear with years franchising (R 2 > 0.60) and highly collinear (R 2 > -0.80) with exclusive territory so the results must be viewed with substantial skepticism. When I drop the variable for number of years franchising from the regression, the results hold for both the exclusive territory variable and the interaction term; however, in a regression that drops the exclusive territory variable, the interaction term is not significant. In a final regression that drops both the exclusive territory and number of years franchising variables, the interaction term is significant and is on the cusp of significance (p value = 0.112). These results provide, at best, mild evidence that the territorial threat substitutes for the formal threat of contract damages. Future research should attempt to examine the scope of this threat in a way that avoids the methodological difficulties present here.
The results from the omission of motels and real estate franchises from the regressions in Table 6 suggest that these industries have specific characteristics that contribute to the frequency with which these sectors use liquidated damage clauses. Omitting these variable, however, makes it difficult to assess the magnitude of the industry effects. To isolate these effects in the real estate sector, I use a matching estimator that focuses on a subset of franchises where there is overlap in the three external covariates, log average start-up costs, the 2004-2006 growth rates, and the number of years franchising, and the two business model covariates, exclusive territories and must-operate requirements. I do not include motels in this analysis because the average start-up costs for this sector are substantially larger than any other group and, consequently, there are no other observations that can be matched closely to this group.
89 Table 7 effect for the treated (PATT) for four franchise sectors, including real estate, where being a member of the relevant sector is the treatment and all other firms are the controls. The PATT estimand is the effect of being a member of the relevant sector as opposed to a member of the other franchises that exist in the population. Each entry uses four control (outside-of-sector firms) matches for every treatment (within-sector firms) observation. The matches are approximate for the three external variables and are exact for the business model variables.
The results confirm the intuition that real estate franchises act differently relative to other franchises that share similar start-up costs, growth rates, and experience. The matching estimator for the real estate model is quite large, 0.625, and is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Insofar as the real estate sector varies in the amount of mobility its franchisees have, this result provides some support for the view that this increased fungibility may make it more difficult to use relational means to punish franchisees because franchisees who have been observed shirking know that they will be able to seek out another franchise without experiencing large losses from devalued specific assets. Given this inability to punish undesirable behavior through relational governance, the presence of a liquidated damages clause appears to substitute as an alternative method to sanction undesirable behavior. Table 7 also shows the estimates of the PATT for fast-food, salon and cosmetics, and cleaning franchises. The PATT for the convenience store, fast-food, and the salon and cosmetics sectors are not statistically significant, which suggests that-relative to similarly situated firms-these industries are not unique in their approach to liqui- 
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Badawi dated damages. 90 The result for cleaning franchises is, however, statistically significant at the 1 percent level and is negative, with a value of -0.182. A potential reason for this result is the relative lack of incentive conflict in the cleaning sector. This industry typically involves a very high degree of repeat business and, for many franchisees, all their business will come from repeat customers. 91 Moreover, cleaning franchisors often act as the intermediaries between customers and the franchisees, which allows the franchisor to replace an ineffective franchisee with a more capable one. This structure means that franchisees are likely to bear a large amount of the cost of shirking because poor service means that clients will choose not to do business with them or the franchisor will not direct clients to them. Unlike fast-food franchises, motels, or other consumer-oriented firms that make up the sample, cleaning franchisees cannot rely as much on walk-in business based on the brand. This diminished ability to externalize the cost of shirking minimizes the governance problem posed by the franchise model and, consequently, cleaning franchises may not need to use the threat of substantial punishments-be they legal or relational-for franchisees to refrain from providing poor service.
D. Robustness Checks
The consistency of the results to multiple specifications and with both the linear probability model and the logit model provide some assurance that the results are robust. One may, however, have concerns about some omitted variables. Two important categories of concerns that may affect the choice to use credible damage threats and relational governance are the differences in court systems that franchisors may use and the geographic dispersion of a franchise system. The court systems may differ generally in their treatment of franchise agreements and specifically in their interpretation of liquidated damages provisions and this variation could affect the governance choices that franchisors make. Accordingly, the analysis should control for this potential variation. The literature has treated the dispersion of franchised outlets as a determinant of monitoring costs and these costs may affect the choices that franchisors make about how to try to control franchisee behavior. 92 To the degree that differences in monitoring costs affect the choice of governance, it is appropriate to control for them.
Controlling for both these variables presents some methodological difficulties. Franchise agreements typically specify both a choice of forum and a choice of law and proper controls would account for both these choices. One could use indicator variables for each individual state as a choice of law and a choice of forum, but the relatively small sample in this study makes this approach difficult. An alternative strategy would be to identify high-quality and low-quality jurisdictions and control for when the agreements use these 90 The lack of statistical significance for the fast-food industry dummy variable and cleaning industry dummy variable in all the specifications in Table 6 provides additional support for the view that these industries are not unique.
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See Brickley, supra note 73 (discussing why cleaning franchises may be less likely to be subject to incentive conflicts relative to other commonly franchised businesses). 
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jurisdictions for choice of law and choice of forum. This technique does not require as many variables, but it does necessitate finding reliable indications of court quality. The rankings of state liability systems conducted by the Chamber of Commerce provide one possible source of this information, but these rankings have recently been subject to sharp criticism with regard to their internal and external validity. 93 Given these concerns about reliability, I am reluctant to use the Chamber of Commerce rankings as a reported control. 94 As an alternative, I identify and control for the four states that the agreements identify most frequently as the choice of law: Arizona (6), California (9), New Jersey (7), and Pennsylvania (6). In a series of unreported regressions, I run the specifications in Table 6 with indicator variables for each of these states as a choice of law. The coefficients on the main variables-log of start-up costs, 2004-2006 growth rate, and years franchisingare quite close to their values in the regressions without these controls and they remain statistically significant. The indicator variables for New Jersey and Pennsylvania are statistically significant in most of the specifications and have positive coefficients. I conduct a similar test for choice of forum. I identify the five states that the agreements use most often as a choice of forum and create indicator variables for each. These states are: California (11), New Jersey (5), Minnesota (6), Pennsylvania (5), and Texas (5). 95 In a series of regressions that include these five indicator variables in the specifications that I use in Table 6 , the coefficients on the main variables are similar to their values in Table 6 and, for the most part, are statistically significant. 96 The indicator variables for a New Jersey forum and a Pennsylvania forum are statistically significant in some specifications and, in these cases, the coefficients are positive.
These tests are necessarily limited, but the stability of the core results is consistent with other evidence on this point. As the review of cases demonstrated, courts show remarkable consistency in their treatment of liquidated damages clauses and the default measure of damages in the context of franchise agreements. This suggests that choice of law and choice of forum may not make much of a difference in the decision about damage clauses in contracts. Another indication that interpretive forum may not play much of a role in governance decisions is the lack of significance of the arbitration 93 See Theodore Eisenberg, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Liability Survey: Inaccurate, Unfair, and Bad for Business, 6 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 969 (2010) . 94 Even if I were to use these rankings, it would be difficult to know how exactly to employ them. Eight of the 20 agreements that contain liquidated damages provisions have New Jersey or Pennsylvania as either the choice of forum or the choice of law so any control would be highly sensitive to the categorization of these two states. The Chamber of Commerce rankings of overall treatment of tort and contract litigation rank Pennsylvania as the 35th best state and Pennsylvania as the 36th best state. See U.S. Chamber of Commerce State Liability Systems Ranking Study, Inst. Legal Reform (2010) . It is difficult to say whether these rankings are sufficiently low enough to be considered a low-quality court and this definition would drive any of the subsequent results.
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In some cases, the contracts specify the franchisee's home state as the choice of forum. I do not classify the choice of forum for these agreements because they are likely to vary with the location of the franchisees.
96
The growth rate is no longer statistically significant in the complete specification that omits real estate and hotel franchises.
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Badawi variable in any of the reported specifications. One suspects that the difference between public courts and arbitration in interpretive approach is larger than that between individual public court jurisdictions. If the choice to use arbitration does not affect choices about contract damages, the choice of state forum or state law may be similarly inconsequential.
The cost of monitoring franchise outlets may be another factor that affects governance decisions if the amount of inspection and attention that is necessary to make effective use of relational governance mechanisms differs from the amount of monitoring that is required to use liquidated damages provisions effectively. Previous work treats monitoring costs as a function of the geographic dispersion of outlets-if two franchises have an equal number of outlets, the one with the largest average distance between outlets is presumed to have larger monitoring costs. 97 The more sophisticated studies that take this approach use GPS data for each individual outlet in order to calculate dispersion precisely.
98 I do not have access to data with this level of detail so I instead use the number of outlets as a rough measure of monitoring costs. This measure is imperfect; some motels have a nationwide presence and have less than a thousand outlets, while some regional fast-food chains have multiple thousands of outlets. Nevertheless, the firms in the sample are almost all active in a broad range of markets so a higher number of outlets should suggest higher concentrations of outlets and, hence, lower monitoring costs. When I add the number of outlets to the specifications in Table 6 , the variable is in no case significant and there are no material changes to the core results.
There are some suggestions in the literature that the mix of company-owned and franchised outlets can be an indication of monitoring costs. 99 If a firm has the infrastructure and experience to operate company-owned outlets, it may be able to use that model for outlets that would be difficult to monitor if they were franchised. Moreover, the use of company-owned outlets can provide information about local market conditions that makes it easier to monitor franchisees that operate in similar markets. These reasons suggest that firms with a higher percentage of company-owned outlets may have lower monitoring costs relative to those that make more extensive use of franchising. When I include the percentage of company-owned outlets in the specifications in Table 6 , the variable is never significant and the main results remain almost identical with respect to the values of coefficients and the significance of the variables. These results provide further evidence that monitoring costs may not affect the choice between formal and informal governance. 
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IV. Conclusion
This article contributes to both the relational governance literature and the economics of franchising literature. Through evidence that informal governance and threats of contract damages act as substitutes, this study provides insight on how real-world transactors solve the principal-agent problem. This showing is consistent with the modified Klein model developed in this article. To the degree that franchisors must offer rents to induce franchisee effort, a credible threat of damages can reduce the amount of rents that need to be offered. The regression results provide support for this theory: if a franchisor does not offer exclusive territories-a significant assurance of compensation-it is more likely to use the credible threat that a liquidated damages provision supplies. Likewise, those franchisors that do not appear to have the external demand that is necessary to use additional outlets as a reward to franchisees appear to rely more extensively on the threat of contract damages.
But a question remains: Why do those franchisors who make wide use of informal rewards and punishments refrain from using a credible threat of damages? Franchisors may decline to put these clauses in contracts when they provide little in terms of a governance benefit-either because they are unlikely to be effective or because less expensive informal approaches are available-and the use of the term imposes some costs. There are two plausible sources of these costs, one that is more economic in nature and another that draws from the relational governance literature. The economic explanation focuses on the preferences of potential and current franchisees. Franchisors compete for franchisees and, given the uncertainty that accompanies an investment in a franchise, potential franchisees may be turned away by the prospect of a failure that means a complete loss of the initial investment and a damage award. Likewise, large and longstanding franchises typically have well-organized franchisee groups that review potential changes to franchise agreements. These groups may object to the use of liquidated damages provisions because many of their members will eventually sign a new agreement. 100 Alternatively, franchisors may fear the effect that a liquidated damage provision has on franchisee behavior. Much of the experimental evidence supports the view that the threat of formal legal sanctions can "crowd out" informal, trust-based behavior in the principal-agent context. Franchisors may similarly worry that the use of a legal threat like contract damages may undermine the reciprocity norm in a manner that leads to franchisees lacking the motivation to exert effort in ways that the contract does not require. The data here are consistent with that view, although they cannot confirm that this effect is at work. The evidence does, however, provide some suggestion that formal and informal governance mechanisms do not complement each other in the franchise context. This evidence is not necessarily inconsistent with the experimental studies that show complementarity; those studies emphasize that resort to formal legal process tends to aid informal 100 As discussed above, well-behaving franchisees may favor the use of liquidated damages provisions because they can effectively control low-quality franchisees from diluting the brand value, but to the degree that the imposition of damage awards does not perfectly correlate with quality and insofar as the use of damages will diminish the informal rewards that franchisors distribute, franchisees may oppose the use of liquidated damages provisions.
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Badawi agreement in situations where future transactions are uncertain and where endgames pose a particular problem. These features do not describe the franchise relationship, where parties have strong assurances of future interactions with each other and where the contracts, through mandatory renewal clauses, seek to avoid end-game problems.
The open question about how liquidated damages impose costs and the lack of support for the complementarity thesis suggest some avenues for future research. Within the franchise context, one might be able to assess the precise operation of liquidated damages through qualitative studies that examine the contract drafting process, the interactions between franchise general counsel and franchisee representatives, and interactions with potential and existing franchisees. One might also try to approach the problem quantitatively through panel data that track changes in contracts and are also able to record inquiries from potential franchisees. Ascertaining where the fault line between complementarity and substitutability lies in the real world would almost certainly require moving outside the franchise context. Advocates of the complementarity view have suggested that societies where parties tend not to deal with one another on a recurring basis have a particularly strong need for formal institutions. 101 This setting may provide one of the better opportunities to determine whether the complementarity hypothesis holds in applied settings.
The primary contributions of this article to the franchising literature are an expansion of the self-enforcement model that accounts for the use of contract damages and an empirical challenge to the primacy of termination in that model. Contract damages can be incorporated into the self-enforcement model as a means to reduce the rents that franchisors have to pay to ensure self-enforcement of the contract. Making these threats credible, however, requires expensive court proceedings that leave franchisors searching for alternative mechanisms of governance. The regressions that estimate this model provide evidence both that damages can play this role and that franchisors use informal rewards as a substitute for the deterrence function that damages can play. At a broader level, this approach suggests that studies of contracting and industrial organization can benefit from attention to the legal doctrines that affect the feasibility of different governance mechanisms.
This article also poses an empirical challenge for franchise research. The widespread use of for-cause requirements in this sample is not consistent with existing models of the franchise relationship and requires further explanation and investigation. Either the parties are obtaining something in return, such as franchisee assurance against franchisor moral hazard, or, as the model developed in this article suggests, franchisors may be able to police franchisees effectively using extra-contractual means that avoid the costs of showing proper cause.
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See North, supra note 2.
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